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Bunting: The Extraterritorial Force of Title VII: Regulating the Conduct o

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL FORCE OF TITLE
VII: REGULATING THE CONDUCT OF
AMERICAN EMPLOYERS OVERSEAS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The ability of Congress to regulate the conduct and affairs of
American employers operating within the United States is a long
accepted premise. The advancement of employee rights in the area
of discriminatory employer practice has dealt a severe blow to the
archaic prejudices of the American employer. The passing of Title
VII marked a major victory for the advocates of employee rights by
changing the face of the employee-employer relationship by protecting workers from the discriminatory policies of their employer and
imposing harsh penalties for its violation.1 With the advent of Title
VII came other congressional statues designed to protect the American laborer,2 the result of which brought employee rights to a new
level of congressional protection. 3 As a result of the recent surge of
employer regulations, American employees have now turned to the
courts to seek the same protection they receive domestically when
faced with employment discrimination by their American employers
4
overseas.
The question of whether Title VII may regulate the conduct of
American employers who operate internationally is a relatively new
one, addressed on rare occasion by the lower federal courts and only
very recently by the Supreme Court.5 The challenges which face attempts at providing extraterritorial reach to congressional statutes
1. See Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).

2. See generally Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988); The
Anti-Apartheid Program of 1986, 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (1979 & Supp. 1989); The Export Regulation Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 (Supp. 1989).

3. Id.
4. See Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian American Oil Co., 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990)
(King, J., dissenting); Akgun v. The Boeing Co., No. 97-104 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file); Seville v. Martin Marrietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986);
Bryant v. International Schools Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
423 (D. Colo. 1976), aff d on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978).
5. Id.; see also E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., - U.S.-, III S.Ct. 1227 (1991).
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are great, ranging from the immunity of foreign sovereignty to the
practical limitations of congressional authority." This Note will explore the issue of Title VII's extraterritorial applicability by examining the judicial history behind attempts at having other congressional acts apply internationally, from the rigid adherence to the
notions of national sovereignty and limited jurisdiction to the current
trends among courts in mandating broad coverage for congressional
acts based on the statutory vagueness of their language. This Note
will also review some of the fundamental barriers which face efforts
at providing extraterritorial force to Title VII, and discuss the way
courts have treated those efforts. Finally, this Note will address the
Supreme Court decision of E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Company,7 and discuss its potential ramifications in the international labor force.
II. THE

EVOLUTION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL CONSTRUCTION

The Supreme Court has traditionally rejected the argument that
congressional statutes have the ability to regulate the affairs of
American actors overseas.' This historical presumption against the
extraterritorial reach of congressional statutes reflected a natural
tendency by the courts toward upholding the right of nations with
regard to retaining absolute sovereignty within their own borders. 9 In
what has historically been classified as the "Doctrine of Absolute
Sovereignty," the Supreme Court established early on the principal
that a nation-state should reign supreme within its own jurisdiction. 10 In one of the first opinions addressing the concept of absolute
sovereignty, Chief Justice Marshall explained that:
6. See generally American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909);
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1948).
7. - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).

8. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). In a case
involving the question of whether American antitrust laws should be applied outside the

United States, Justice Holmes remarked that "[iut is surprising to hear it argued" that antitrust laws should apply to acts "outside the jurisdiction of the United States and within that of
other states." Id. at 355. "'All legislation'" Holmes noted, "'is prima facie territorial'." Id. at
357 (quoting Ex parteBlair, 12 Ch D. 522, 528 (Ch. App. 1879); See also Ross v. McIntyre,
140 U.S. 453 (1891); The Schooner Exch. v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812);
Slater v. Mexican National R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).

9. id.
10.

The Schooner Exch. v. M'Fadden, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116. The M'Faddendecision

involved an unusual set of circumstances in which an American vessel was pirated by a band
of militants allegedly acting under the orders of Napoleon Bonaparte of France. The French
subsequently claimed title to the vessel and its contents, and later sailed into a port in Philadelphia. Acting upon the request of the ship's original owners, a court ordered the vessel
seized, pending the outcome of a legal action filed by the original owners.
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[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitations not
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would limply a diminution of its sovereignty to the
extent of the restriction and an investment of that sovereignty to
the same extent in that power which could impose such
restriction."
Although Marshall seemingly crippled the ability of Congress to effectively regulate the conduct of American actors overseas, he was
nevertheless careful to point out that Americans would retain a degree of immunity, guaranteed by certain provision of the Constitution, should they travel abroad.' 2 Justice Field modified Marshall's
absolutist view of state sovereignty to an extent when the Supreme
Court decided In re Ross1 3 toward the close of the nineteenth century. The case involved the constitutional legitimacy of the murder
conviction of John Ross, who committed the crime on board an
American vessel docked at a harbor in Yokohama, Japan.14 Court
was held in Kanagawa, Japan, by a counsel general of the United
States who tried and convicted Ross for murder, sentencing him to
death.' 5 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Field determined
that the court which heard the case had the express authority to do
so.' 6 The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction conferred to the court
directly, both by treaty and statute.' It was on the basis of this express jurisdictional mandate that Justice Field determined that the
court which heard the case had acted within a permissible scope of
authority, and was therefore entitled to invoke its jurisdiction over
Ross. 18 Justice Field, however, urged that a strong presumption necessarily exists against the proposition that an Act of Congress may
effectively regulate the conduct of American citizens outside the
11. Id. at 136. The Court concluded that "[a]ll exceptions, therefore, to the full and
complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the
other nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source." Id.
12. Chief Justice Marshall stressed the necessity of protecting Americans from arrest or
detention, he emphasized that foreign ministers were entitled to broad immunity, and that
troop movements which traversed another nation with that nation's consent were entitled to
protection. Id. at 136-47. Aside from these limited instances, it was clear that Marshall's dogmatic adherence to the principals of absolute sovereignty would effectively restrict congressional legislation to an entirely domestic focus. Id.
13. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 460.
18. Id.
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United States."9 Field stressed that there must exist an express authority and jurisdiction for Congress to act, granted directly under
the provisions of the Constitution, and that such authority must necessarily be limited to the purpose for which the authority was
granted."0
In the majority opinion, Justice Field stated that "[t]he Constitution can have no operation in another country. When, therefore,
the representatives or officers of our government are permitted to
exercise authority of any kind in another country, it must be on such
conditions as the two countries may agree, the laws of either one
being obligatory upon the other."'" In their conclusion, the majority
suggested that while the Constitution itself may not be given jurisdictional effect outside the United States, it can, by operation of
treaty or statute, be given limited extraterritorial force subject to the
acquiescence of the nation where the law is to be applied.
This rather narrow construction of extraterritorial coverage was
carried into the twentieth century by Justice Holmes in American
Banana Company v. United Fruit Company,22 when he reiterated
Justice Field's territorial restrictions in discussing the limitations of
antitrust laws overseas.2 The plaintiff in the case, an Alabama corporation doing business in Panama, sought to bring an antitrust action to recover damages from an incident where, at the instigation of
a major regional competitor, Costa Rican soldiers seized part of the
corporation's plantation and cargo. 24 In deciding whether the plaintiff may lawfully assert an antitrust claim for damages as a result of
the seizure in Panama, Justice Holmes answered in the negative, explaining that:
[t]he forgoing considerations would lead in case of doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined to its operation
and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has
general and legitimate power. "All legislation is primafacie territorial." [T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done.25
19. Id. at 461-479.
20. Id. at 461-62 (referring to Congress' power to create a Court. U.S. Const. art. 111,

§ 2.)

21. Id. at 460.
22. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
23. Id.

24. Id. at 349-50. Plaintiff filed suit under section 7 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988).
25. Id. at 356 (quoting Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904)).
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Although the Court objected to the Corporation's assertion that the
Sherman Act had territorial force in Panama, Justice Holmes did
suggest that an explicit provision providing for such coverage, if
closely related to a constitutional concern, may have been regarded
as a legitimate exercise of congressional authority.26 Nevertheless,
Justice Holmes seemed to suggest that such a provision would be the
subject of a great deal of scrutiny before being given extraterritorial
effect.27
Although the Supreme Court had initially fashioned a seemingly impregnable rule, the current trend of the Court suggests that
this caveat is by no means absolute.2 Two decades after deciding
American Banana Company,29 the Supreme Court in Blackmer v.
United States"0 criticized the majority's reasoning in American Banana, questioning the rigid adherence to the notions of limited jurisdiction and national sovereignty.31 Signaling a much more amenable
approach to the issue of territorial limitations, the Supreme Court
embarked on a more liberal and more ambitious policy of granting
congressional acts extraterritorial effect. On a writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court's decree that Harry Blackmer, an American citizen residing in Paris, was guilty of contempt
for failure to respond to subpoenas served on him while living in
France.a2 In support of the circuit court's decision, Chief Justice
Hughes set forth what has since proven to be a commonly used standard for judging the territorial limitations of a congressional statute.
While the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent
appears, is construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
26. Id. at 355-56. Justice Holmes reasoned that:
[n]o doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law that
civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such countries may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by their own law, and keep to some extent
the old notion of personal sovereignty alive.
Id. The Court referred to The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403 (1907); British South Africa Co.
v. Companhia de Mocambique, A.C. 609 (1893).
27. Justice Holmes then concluded by reaffirming the majority view remarking:
[for another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him
according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts,
not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly
might resent.
Id. at 356.
28. See supra note 1.
29. 213 U.S. 347.
30. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 433 (1931).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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of the United States, the question of its application, so far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries are concerned, is one
of construction, not of legislative power

.

. Nor can it be doubted

that the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty
to require the return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere,
whenever the public interest requires it, and to penalize him in case
of refusal.33
The Court in Blackmer acknowledged Congress' ability to regulate
the conduct of American actors overseas, conceding that even in the
absence of express language providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction, such force may nevertheless be permitted where the language of
the act reveals an intent to have the act so construed. The Court
nevertheless urged that any attempt to give extraterritorial force to
an Act of Congress should be weighed by the compelling interests of
having the act so construed, against the other nation's interest in
having its own laws apply.3 4 Chief Justice Hughes' continued references to the substantial federal interest in serving subpoenas, suggesting that "[t]he mere giving of such a notice to the citizen in the
foreign country of the requirement of his government that he shall
return is in no sense an invasion of any right of the foreign government; and the citizen has no standing to invoke any such supposed
right," 35 echoed the Court's concern over the possibility of infringing
on another nation's sovereignty with a law which may not reflect a
substantial concern of Congress. Unlike the potential problems
which might have arisen with a conflict between American and Panamanian laws in American Banana Company,36 (that is, the Sherman Act versus the significantly less developed concepts of antitrust
violations covered by Panamanian law), Chief Justice Hughes carefully pointed out that such a conflict was not possible with the limited effect of subjecting American citizens to effective service
abroad.37 Nonetheless, the Court's implicit repudiation of the ironclad barriers of state sovereignty and limited jurisdiction paved the
way for increasingly receptive views concerning extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
A more substantial regulation of American conduct overseas
was addressed only a few years later by the Supreme Court in Foley
33. Id. at 437.
34. Id. at 438-39.
35. Id. at 439.
36.
37.

American Banana Co., 213 U.S. 347.
Blackmer, 248 U.S. at 438-39.
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Brothers v. Filardo.8 In a leading case addressing the issue of congressional intent, the Supreme Court sought to ascertain the con-

gressional objective behind the projected reach of the Federal Eight

Hour Law39 by searching the text of the statute for implicit lan-

guage which would offer "any" indication of a congressional intent
to have coverage extend overseas.40 Demonstrating a more tolerable
disposition in assessing whether an act has extraterritorial reach, the

Supreme Court also examined the legislative history of the Federal
Eight Hour Law to determine whether anything dispositive in the

Statute's history would support the conclusion that the Act was intended to apply overseas. 4 Although relying in part on the Court's

most restrictive caveat set forth in the Blackmer decision, 42 the Supreme Court in Foley Brothers employed a much more receptive
view of extraterritorial reach by broadening the seemingly restrictive
scope of Blackmer.43
The decisions of Blackmer and Foley Brothers signaled the vir-

tual death of the absolutist view of territorial restraints on jurisdiction espoused by Chief Justice Marshall and employed by the Court
for over a century. The traditional view of sovereignty has yielded to
the emergence of a belief that the United States must maintain rela-

tions with those citizens beyond its geographic borders. Indeed, this
notion has increasingly been a predominant driving force behind efforts to provide extraterritorial focus to a number of congressional

acts.44 In discussing the ability of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments

to regulate the conduct of American citizens in England, the Su38. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 271 (1948).
39. Eight Hour Law, 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326 (repealed. Pub. L. 87-581, title II, § 203,
Aug. 13, 1962, 76 Stat. 360). Section 325 provided, in effect, that every contract to which the
United States is a party shall contain a provision that no laborer or mechanic doing any part
of the work contemplated by the contract shall be required or permitted to work more than
eight hours in any one day upon such work unless he is compensated at the rate of one and a
one-half times the basic rate of pay, for all work in excess of eight hours per day.
40. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. 271.
41. Id. at 282.
42. 284 U.S. 421.
43. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. 271.
44. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (holding that
§§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act were appropriately applied to the conduct of American actors
operating in Canada since their activities had an impact within the markets of the United
States and upon its foreign trade); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 120
(1911) (holding that "[a]n agreement or combination which in purpose or effect conflicts
therewith, although actually made in a foreign country where not unlawful, gives no immunity
to parties acting here in pursuance of it."); see also United States v. Pacific & Artie R.R. &
Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); see
also infra notes 47 and 48.
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preme Court flatly rejected the territorial restraints discussed by the
Court in Ross v. McIntyre,45 Justice Black exclaimed that "[a]t
best, the Ross case should be left as a relic from a different era."46
Similarly, the Court's decision in American Banana Company that
the Sherman Act had limited territorial effect, was also overruled by
a series of decisions which found that the statue applied in all cases
overseas where there was some impact on industry within the United
States. In the second half of this century the Supreme Court has
demonstrated little restraint in determining territorial limitations. 47
Fewer statutes are found to lack the requisite congressional intent
for overseas coverage. In the areas of antitrust, securities, and trade
regulations in particular, courts have given the Foley Brothers standard little deference in their analysis of congressional intent.
In the areas of antitrust, securities and international trade law,
federal courts have acted with little restraint in expanding the broad
language of congressional regulations to control the conduct of
American actors overseas. The application of American antitrust
laws to regulate American actors operating abroad has evolved from
the prohibitive doctrines espoused by the Justice Holmes in American Banana Company to broad jurisdictional mandates ordered by
courts acting on the vague language of the American antitrust regulations. 48 Most courts generally employ a balancing method, weighing the government interests in having antitrust regulations apply extraterritorially against a number of factors, including the interests
and concerns of the foreign nation where those laws are to apply, the
extent of the corporation's business relations in that country and the
potential effects of anti-competitive conduct on markets in the
United States. 49 While the recent approaches assumed by the courts
45.
46.
47.
48.

140 U.S. 453 (1891).
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1955).
See supra note I.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir.

1945) (holding that jurisdiction existed over foreign aluminum producers engaged in pricefixing because they intended their actions to have an effect on American markets); Timberline

Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The Court suggested that a threeprong analysis be used as an "evaluation and balancing of the relevant considerations in each
case.
...
Id. at 613. The Court determined that the elements to be weighed include the
"degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and

the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement
by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, [and] the relative significance of effects
on the United States and elsewhere.
...
Id. at 614; Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum

Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a "substantial effect" on United
States commerce would sustain jurisdiction).
49. See supra note 34.
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often lead to a great deal of uncertainty over the current reach of

American antitrust regulations, the trend over the past fifty years
evidences an extremely tolerant view by the courts towards attempts

subjecting American actors operating overseas to the prohibitions of
American antitrust laws.5"
The judicial system has also seen a substantial growth in the
jurisdictional reach of United States securities laws over the past
twenty years as well.5 1 Relying on the statutory vagueness of the

1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, courts have displayed a great deal of
ingenuity in their attempts to regulate the overseas affairs of both

American and foreign business entities.52 Under the most current
theory which has gained steady support, courts typically establish

jurisdiction upon a finding of either fraudulent conduct that has occurred within the United States,5 a or that fraudulent conduct outside
the United States has had an impact on securities markets within the

United States.54 In either event, courts often perceive the threat of
an adverse effect on American markets directly or indirectly, as be-

ing the event which triggers the justifiable application of American
securities laws. 5 Likewise, in the area of foreign trade, courts have
50. See Kestenbaum, Antitrust's "Extraterritorial"Jurisdiction:A Proper Report On

The Balancing Of Interests Test, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 311, 316-17 (1982).
51. See supra notes 38-40. See also Thomas, ExtraterritorialityIn An Era Of Internationalization Of The Securities Markets: The Need To Revisit Domestic Policies, 35
RUTGERs L. REV. 452, 452-54 (1983).
52. The Second Circuit held that fraudulent misrepresentations made in the United
States to an American company constituted adequate grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction,
although the actual transaction occurred overseas. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d
974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Continental Grain (Australia) Partnership Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 417-22 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548
F.2d 109 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
53. For a discussion of the trends of extraterritorial application of congressional statutes
see Note, PredictabilityAnd Comity: Toward Common PrincipalsOf ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 93 HARv. L. RaV. 1310 (1985); Schenefield, U.S. Antitrust In The International
Arena - The Problem And Some Solutions, 98 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1989); Thomas, Extraterritoriality In An Era Of InternationalizationOf The Securities Markets: The Need To
Revisit Domestic Principals,35 RUTGERS L. REV. 452, 452-54 (1983).
54. Leasco Data ProcessingEquip. Corp., 468 F.2d 1326, 1344 ; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that the depressive effects of the fraudulent
activities of a Canadian Corporation on an American stockholder was sufficient to warrant
application of the 1934 Securities Act).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 810-15 (1948)
(holding that a British corporation was "transacting business" and was "found" in the Southern District of New York within the meaning of § 12 of the Clayton Act, so that it could be
sued there). United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp.
40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (finding foreign subsidiaries of an American incorporated entity subject to
United States jurisdiction because they had committed the America parent to Swiss restric-
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broadly construed the language of congressional acts and trade
agreements as a basis for regulating the conduct of both American
and foreign actors abroad. 56
Courts have generally acknowledged that their broad interpretations of congressional legislation in these areas largely reflects a
growing concern over corporate attempts to gain competitive advantages and increase profitability under the substantially less restrictive
regulations of other countries. The resulting effect which have adversely impacted on American markets prompted increased demands
both by the domestic business community and by federal regulatory
agencies that these actors be subject to congressional regulations.
The concern over a potential for conflict with foreign law is minimal,
since many nations adhere to a strict policy of laissez-faire, and
make little attempt at regulating American corporations. Although
the objective of the Court toward permitting such liberal construction of these statutes reflects the concern of the American business
community in retaining a competitive edge vis-a-vis their foreign adversaries, it remains to be seen whether this policy will expand significantly into other areas of international concern.
III. PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
Two arguments have essentially been put forth by proponents
who seek to limit the jurisdiction of Title VII to a domestic focus.
The first argument rests upon historical precedent established by the
Supreme Court which embraces the right of all nations to retain absolute authority over the activities of commercial actors within their
borders.57 The Supreme Court has normally rejected the notion that
laws should have extraterritorial focus, stressing instead that each
nation is entitled to complete sovereignty within their own jurisdiction, and that their laws should neither be contradicted nor amended
by the laws of other nations. 58 Despite this seemingly invincible canon, the current trend of Supreme Court decisions suggests a more
tions, and because the corporations did not appear to treat each other as independent entities).
56. See Griffin, Possible Restrictions of International Disputes Over Enforcement of
U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. L. INT'L L. 279, 279 n.1 (1983); See also Note, Compelling
Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 877, 877 n.1
(1982); Staff of Subcomm. on Investigation, Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, 145-253
(Comm. Print 1983).
57. See supra note 8. The Supreme Court had traditionally relied on the position that a
nation reigns supreme within its own jurisdiction, both on the principal of sovereignty as well
as the principal of limited territorial jurisdiction.
58. Id.
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amenable approach to this concept, noting that certain subjects are
so interrelated with Constitutional guarantees that particular laws
addressing these rights should be permitted to regulate conduct of
American commercial actors overseas. The second argument is
grounded in ascertaining whether a congressional intent to have the
act apply internationally is evident in the statutory language. The
argument follows that in addition to the statutory silence with regard
to the issue, there is also a complete absence of any dispositive language in the statute which could be construed as providing for such
coverage. Citing to the fact that Congress has amended certain acts
with provisions providing for extraterritorial coverage, the argument
suggests that the absence of any such provision in Title VII indicates
a congressional intent to limit the jurisdiction of Title VII to domestic claims.
The Supreme Court has traditionally found laws providing for
extraterritorial coverage invalid, echoing the historical notion that
nations are entitled to absolute authority to regulate the affairs of
actors under its jurisdiction. 59 This tenacious adherence to the principal of sovereignty has been a chief obstacle for attempts to have
laws regulate the commercial activity of employers overseas. In the
1949 landmark decision of Foley Brothers,60 however, the Supreme
Court laid down what has since been commonly used by courts as a
standard for determining whether a law should have extraterritorial
reach.6 1 The case involved an American citizen who was hired by an
American contracting company to work overseas as a cook, and
travel with the company on construction projects through the Middle
and Far East. 2 The plaintiff was then sent to work in Iraq, where he
frequently worked more than eight hours a day.63 He then requested
overtime pay for the work done in excess of the eight hour shifts. 4
After having his request denied several times by his employer, the
employee brought an action in the New York Supreme Court,65 al59. Id.
60. 336 U. 281. This case, along with the opinion in Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 433 (1932), marks a turning point for the jurisdictional construction of congressional
acts. Id. The Court's decisions in these cases represents a judicial cornerstone for future interpretations of the jurisdictional reach of congressional acts. Id.
61. However, in the areas of securities, antitrust and international trade in particular,
courts have made exceptions to this rule since the paramount need to regulate the evasive
tactics of American companies is thought to supersede the concerns of the nations where they
operate. See supra notes 38-41.
62. Id. at 283-84.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Filardo v. Foley Bros., 272 App. Div. 446, 71 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1947).
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leging that his employer had violated section 324 of the Federal
Eight Hour Law (hereinafter "Law") for failing to reimburse him
for the excess work. e6 On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed a New York Court of Appeals decision granting plaintiff
relief, under the assumption that the Law had territorial effect in
Iraq.6' 7 In delivering the majority opinion, Justice Reed conceded
that since Congress no doubt had the authority to extend the Law to
work performed in other nations, the inquiry should instead focus
upon whether Congress had intended to make the Law applicable to
such work. 8
The Supreme Court determined that there were three approaches which could be undertaken to ascertain whether Congress
had intended that the Law be given extraterritorial effect.6 9 The
Court first examined the language of the Law, for purposes of determining whether there was any indication of a congressional purpose
to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction.7 0 The Court searched the
statutory language for any inferences that may reveal a congressional intent to extend coverage extraterritorially. 71 The Court also
looked to the laws of Iraq, to determine whether there were laws
which would permit congressional authority to extend over the labor
laws of Iraq.72 Second, the Court declared that the legislative history
66. Id. (referring to the Eight Hour Law, 40 U.S.C. § 324 (1912) (repealed Pub. L. 87581, title II, § 203, Aug. 13, 1962, 76 Stat. 360)). Section 325(a) of the Act provided that:
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the wages of every laborer and
mechanic employed by any contractor or subcontractor engaged in the performance
of any contract of the character specified in sections 324 and 325 of this title, shall
be computed on a basic day rate of eight hours per day and work in excess of eight
hours per day shall be permitted upon compensation for all hours worked in excess
of eight hours per day at not less than one and one-half times the basic rate of pay.
40 U.S.C. § 325(a). (Section 325 has since been repealed).
67. 297 N.Y. 217, 78 N.E.2d 480 (1948). The New York Court of Appeals concluded
that "[w]ords of such inclusive reach cannot properly be read to exclude contracts for government jobs abroad." Id. at 225, 78 N.E.2d 484.
68. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 284-85.
69. Id. at 285-89.
70. Id. In determining whether there was any indication in the Act to have it apply in
Iran, the Court concluded that:
[t]here is no language in the Eight Hour Law, here in question, that gives any
indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over
which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control.
There is nothing brought to our attention indicating that the United States had been
granted by the respective sovereignties any authority, legislative or otherwise, over
the labor laws or customs of Iran or Iraq.
Id. at 285.
71. Id. at 285-86.
72. The issue of whether another nation's law conflicts or supports the legislative effect
of the act on the citizen within that country's border has, to a large extent, yielded to the issue
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of an act may also be used to reveal a Congressional intent to pro-

vide extraterritorial jurisdiction in the absence of any express statutory language.7 3 Justice Reed noted that while there ordinarily exists

a presumption that Congress concerns itself primarily with domestic
conditions, there may be instances where the legislative history may
evidence a congressional purpose to broaden the jurisdictional scope

of an act. 4 The Court found that the Law was drafted as a result of
Congress' concern with domestic labor conditions, focusing exclu-

sively on the need for improved labor conditions in the United
States.7 5 The Court also searched subsequent amendments to the

Law, to determine whether there was language which might reveal a
Congressional purpose to extend coverage outside the jurisdiction of
the United States. 76 Where neither of the first two approaches ade-

quately demonstrated an implied purpose toward broadening a law's
jurisdiction, the Court suggested that administrative interpretations
of whether enforcement of the act is consistent with international law. See, e.g., Weinberger v.
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 344 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1952); McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 101, 121 (1963); Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 n.155 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v.
Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 1983); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie
de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This conflict with
international law has also been addressed by section 403 of the Restatements (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. The American Institute of Law has determined that "as a matter of
international law 'a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable'." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 134 (1984).
73. In the absence of an express conferral of congressional grant to provide extraterritorial coverage, courts will normally focus on whether a legislative intent existed, evidenced
through the language of the act and its legislative history, to establish territorial limitations.
The absence of a specific provision granting extraterritorial effect has rarely, by itself, been
considered conclusive evidence of a congressional intent to have the act apply domestically.
See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428 (1989); Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25,
32 (1982); Continental Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 578-79 (1953); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 28586 (1952); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1948); Tamari v. Bache &
Co., 730 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1984); Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Timberline Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d
597, 609 (1976); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d
Cir. 1972).
74. This proposition has been commonly used in Court decisions. See, e.g., Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 at 285; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 at 437;
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 at 357; United States v. Bowman,
260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922); United States v. Mitchell, 533 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977);
Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103 at 1107 n.1l; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 at 493.
75. Foley Bros., 284 U.S. at 285-86.
76. Id. at 286-87.
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of the Law "in its various phases of levelopment" may be used as
a third method to shed light on the potential scope of jurisdiction. 8
The Supreme Court cited various Executive Orders, noting that
there was no indication that any effort had been made to enforce the
Law in territories outside United States jurisdiction. 79 Finally, the
Court considered letters from the Secretary of War, Secretary of
Treasury, Department of State and so forth, remarking on the absence of any presumption in those letters that the Law had extraterritorial effect. 80 The Court ultimately concluded that application of
any one of the three approaches either by itself or in tandem was
insufficient for purposes of establishing the existence of a congressional intent to provide extraterritorial coverage.
In a somewhat analogous situation, a number of lower courts
have wrestled with the issue of whether the Age Discrimination In
Employment Act81 (hereinafter "ADEA"), offered adequate Congressional intent to grant extraterritorial reach to the Acts.8 2 Since
the ADEA was silent oii the question of territorial focus, the courts
have unanimously concluded that Congress had not intended to have
the ADEA apply extraterritorially. 83 In 1984, however, Congress
amended the ADEA by including in the definition of employee "any
individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country." 84 Thus, Congress added
a clear statement providing for extraterritorial application, obviating
the need for judicial guesswork. Opponents of Title VII extraterritorial application have cited to the fact the ADEA has been traditionally treated by the courts as an essentially domestic act, limited in
force to United States jurisdiction. 5 Citing the lack of congressional
77.
78.

Id. at 288.
Id. at 288-90.

79. Id.
80.

Id. The Court in fact wound up concluding that the "administrative interpretations

of the Act, although not specifically directed at the precise problem before us, tend to support
petitioners' contention as to its restricted geographical scope." Id. at 290.
81. Age Discrimination In Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).
82. See generally Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir.1984)
(holding that ADEA does not apply to an American employer who fired American citizens in
Honduras); Belanger v. Keydril Co., 596 F. Supp. 823, 824-25 (E.D. La. 1984) (holding that
ADEA does not apply to American nationals employed outside the United States by an American employer); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1263 (D.N.J. 1983),
affid, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984); Pfeiffer v. Wm.Wrigley Jr. Co., 573 F. Supp. 458, 459-61
(N.D. I1. 1983), af/'d, 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
83. Id.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
85. See Akgun v. The Boeing Co., No. 97-104 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file); Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian Am. Oil Co., 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990).
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intent in proving extraterritorial fore to the ADEA, and the fact that
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FSLA") provided for no extraterritorial application, the Tenth Circuit in 1984 noted that "courts
should be loath to circumvent such intent."8 6 Therefore, the argument follows that since ADEA, (a regulation of employer conduct
like Title VII and sharing a similar legislative history as Title VII),
has been construed as a domestic act by the courts and, consequently, Title VII should be treated in a similar manner.
IV.

JUDICIAL SCRUTINY: THE QUESTION OF THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF TITLE VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted by Congress in an effort to eliminate discrimination in the workplace." Reflecting the evolving attitude of the American public towards emerging beliefs in equality and individual rights, Congress declared Title
VII "a national policy to protect the right of persons to be free from

. . . discrimination."881 The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke

Power88 remarked that "[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment
of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees." 90
The majority of legislation, executive orders and Supreme Court
decisions addressing the scope of Title VII have focused on essentially domestic disputes. Notwithstanding the vast number of American laborers employed outside the United States, 91 claims over the
86. Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d at 829. The Court referred to the fact
that the FLSA was n integral part of the ADEA, stating that it was properly used as evidence

to determine congressional intent. Id.
87.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964 & Supp. 1989). Title VII establishes that it

is unlawful employment practices for an employer:
(1)to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-

criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-

wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
88. H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2341, 2401.
89. 401 U.S. 424 (1970).

90. Id. at 429-30.
91. By 1970, some 680,000 United States citizens worked overseas in private employment. Social & Economic Statistics Admin., Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

15

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 5
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 9:1

conditions of their employment rarely arise. A district court decision
in 1976 was the first case to ever address the territorial limitations of
Title VII. Since then, however, the issue of the extent of Title VII's
jurisdictional authority has been addressed on several occasions by
the courts, and only recently, by the Supreme Court.92 Both the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC"), the agencies responsible for administering Title VII, have maintained that the Act was intended to apply
extraterritorially. 93 Nevertheless, Congress has remained virtually silent on the matter, offering no indication on whether Title VII is a
domestic or international regulation. The absence of legislative interpretation has therefore left the issue to the courts, where the debate
was ultimately addressed by the Supreme Court.
The issue of whether Title VII regulates the employment practices of American employers overseas has rarely been addressed by
the federal courts and only recently presented itself before the Supreme Court.9 4 Before the Supreme Court passed judgment, the only
circuit to address this issue has been the Fifth Circuit, which held
that Title VII "does not reflect the necessary clear expression of
Congressional intent to extend its reach beyond our borders." 95 Since
no specific provision exists prescribing the territorial limitations of
Title VII, courts have searched the language of the Act and its executive and legislative history to ascertain whether Congress had intended an extraterritorial application. The primary argument supporting extraterritorial application of Title VII is based upon the
Americans Living Abroad (1973) (reporting the 1970 census).
92. See supra note 4.
93. The Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agencies responsible for administering Title VII, agree that the statute applies
extraterritorially. During legislative debate over proposals to prohibit United States employers
from participating in foreign boycotts requiring religion-based employment discrimination,
Justice Scalia, then Assistant Attorney general, argued that the amendment were not necessary because Title VII already prohibited employment discrimination. See Discriminatory
Arab Pressure on U.S. Business: Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Trade and
Commerce of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1975)
(statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General). EEOC General Counsel William
A. Carey agreed that Title VII applies extraterritorially. Referring to § 2000e-I he wrote:
"[i]f [that section] is to have any meaning at all, it is necessary to construe it as expressing a
Congressional intent to extend coverage in overseas operations of domestic corporations at the
same time it excludes aliens of the domestic corporation from the operation of the statute."
Letter from William A. Carey, EEOC General Counsel, to Sen. Frank Church (Mar. 17,
1975), reprinted in Note, Civil Rights, Employment and The Multinational Corporations,10
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 102-03 (1976).
94. See supra note 4.
95. Boureslan v. Aramco, 892 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1990).
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negative inference from section 702, the alien exemption provision of
Title VII. 98 The provision precludes alien laborers from asserting Title VII claims against employers when they work outside the United
States.9 7 Proponents argue that the provision's language which excludes extraterritorial protection for aliens working overseas reveals
an implicit congressional intent to extend such protection to American citizens.98 The argument focuses on the provision's silence with
regard to American employees, urging that since they are noticeably
absent from this exemption, Congress must have intended to grant
them protection overseas. This argument, appropriately entitled the
"negative implication argument", has found support in a number of
recent court decisions. 99
The negative implication argument was first established by the
District Court of Colorado in a 1976 decision. In Love v. Pullman
Company,100 the District Court addressed the question of whether
Canadian porters, working for a Delaware based employer operating
in Quebec, would have protection under Title VII. Citing to section
2000e-1 of the Act, the Court answered in the negative, explaining
that because 2000e-1 specifically denied coverage to aliens who were
not employed within the United States, by negative inference, American laborers in Quebec would be entitled to Title VII protection.
The District Court noted that:
American citizens who were employed by Pullman in Canada
are entitled to full relief without any subtraction. This conclusion
rests on the negative inference of section 702 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. Since Congress explicitly excluded aliens employed outside any state, it must have intended to
provide relief to American citizens employed outside of any state in
an industry affecting commerce by an employer otherwise covered
by the act. 01

This argument was reinforced four years later when the District
96. § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1988).
97. The provision provides in relevant part: "[t]his subchapter shall not apply to an
employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any state, or to a religious corporation ...

."

(emphasis added). Id.

98. See generally Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D.Colo.
1976), affid on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978); Bryant v. International
Schools Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562
(3d Cir. 1982); Boureslan v. Aramco, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (King, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D.Colo. 1976), afid on other grounds, 569
F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978).
101. Id. at 426 (n.4).
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Court of New Jersey decided Bryant v. International Schools.10 2
The District Court decided that the plaintiffs, American teachers
who were working in Iran, were entitled to assert a Title VII claim
against their American based employer for discriminatory promotional policies.103 The plaintiffs in the case, Dottie Bryant and Theresa Lillibridge, were hired by the defendant, a New Jersey based
corporation, to teach in an American school in Iran. 10 4 Plaintiffs
claimed that their contacts with the school, which were negotiated in
Iran, provided fewer benefits then the contracts of their male colleagues, negotiated in the United States. 10 5 Consequently, the plaintiffs consequently brought this suit in the Federal District Court of
New Jersey, in October, 1978.106 Both Lillibridge and Bryant alleged that they had been the victims of unlawful sex discrimination,
and sought monetary damages for benefits which they believed were
unlawfully denied by their employer. 0 7 The corporation asserted
that Title VII did not apply to corporate conduct that occurred
outside the United States. 108 Even if the Act were to apply, however,
the corporation argued that the government of Iran forbade the
school from supplying duplicate benefits to the plaintiffs, who were
married to men working with the government under contracts that
contained the benefits the plaintiffs had not received. 10 9
In addressing the defendant's argument that Title VII was limited to a purely domestic focus, the District Court held that the statutory language of Title VII reveals a congressional intent to give
extraterritorial effect to the Act. 110 The Court relied almost exclusively on the language of Love v. Pullman,"" when it determined
that the negative implication of the alien exemption provision in section 702 offered adequate evidence of a congressional intent to extend Title VII coverage overseas." 2 The Third Circuit Court reversed on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not established a prima
102.

502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir.

1982).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 482.

105. Id. at 474.
106.
107.

502 F. Supp. 472.
Id.

108.

Id. at 478-80.

109.

Id.

110. Id. at 481-83.
111. See supra note 87 (discussing the negative implication of § 702).
112. Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 482 (citing Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 426).
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facie case of sex discrimination.11 3 The Court, however, noted that
the case raised "significant questions regarding the applicability of
Title VII to the overseas employment practices of a private American employer. ' 114 The Court, however, failed to address the traditional obstacles facing such coverage, which presume all laws to have
domestic focus in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary.
Instead, both the Love v. Pullman Court and the Bryant Court were
satisfied that a congressional purpose to provide for extraterritorial
coverage was evidenced through the alien exemption provision. 1 5
On February 2, 1990, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 95 decision affirmed a lower court's determination that Title VII was
intended by Congress to have a domestic focus only.11 Ironically,
the Fifth Circuit had affirmed a district court's holding which applied Title VII to an action arising in another country only a few
years prior to this decision.117 In a case where an American employer in Saudi Arabia initiated a policy which required helicopter
pilots to convert to Islam as a condition of approval to fly over
Mecca, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision under the assumption
that Title VII was enforceable against the American employer.1 18
The Fifth Circuit, however, failed to specifically address the jurisdictional limitations of the Title VII since the employer was held not to
violate the Act. 11 9 Consequently, the court in Boureslan emphasized
this fact when it ruled that Title VII was to be given a domestic
focus and has no operation with respect to events overseas. 120 The
plaintiff in this latest decision was Ali Boureslan, an American citizen who worked for a Delaware based oil company with its principal
113.
114.

675 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 565.

115. This logic was supported by the Maryland District Court in 1986, which agreed
that the 'alien exemption' provision satisfied the Foley Brothers standard of evidencing a congressional intent to give international force to an act. Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F.
Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986).
116. Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian Am. Oil Co., 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990).
117. Kern v. Dynalectron Corp, 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (N.D. Tex. 1983) affd 746
F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984). The case involved the question of whether an American employer's

policy of requiring all helicopter pilots to convert to Islam as a condition of approval to fly over
Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Id. The plaintiff, a pilot who claimed that such a policy discriminated
against him on the bias of his religion, challenged the policy under Title VII. Id. The District
court analyzed the issue assuming that Title VII had jurisdictional effect in Saudia Arabia. Id.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision that the policy was not violative of
Title VII, but failed to discuss whether the District Court had improperly construed the jurisdictional scope of Title VII. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Boureslan, 892 F.2d 1271 at 1273.
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operations in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 121 Boureslan, who was born in
Lebanon, claimed that shortly after he began his employment in
Saudi Arabia, his supervisor subjected him to a series of racial, ethnic and religious slurs that culminated in his dismissal in 1984.122
Boureslan subsequently filed charges against his employer,
ARAMCO, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and later brought a Title VII action in the Southern District Court
of Texas, 123 alleging discriminatory employer practices because of
his race, religion and national origin. The action was subsequently
dismissed by the district court for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 24 and an appeal to the Fifth Circuit followed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the district
court, 12 5 holding that Title VII was never intended to regulate the
practices of American employers with regard to their employment of
American citizens outside the United States. 1 2 The Court of Appeals relied primarily upon three essential arguments in support of
its position. The majority opinion, written by Judge W. Eugene Davis, set its arguments in the context of early Supreme Court precedent which placed significant emphasis on the fundamental concept
of sovereignty, thereby creating the strong presumption against extraterritorial effect. 127 The majority stressed that "[t]he critical
question that governs this appeal is whether Congress included language in Title VII that reflects a clear Congressional intent to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of the
act." 2 The plaintiff, Ali Boureslan, claimed that the necessary language giving Title VII extraterritorial effect was found in section
702 of the Act, the alien exemption provision. 129 By employing the
negative inference argument that had proved successful in Love v.
Pullman' and Bryant v. InternationalSchools,131 Boureslan maintained that Congress' express preclusion of extraterritorial protection
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1271-72.
Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian Am. Oil Co., 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
Id.
Boureslan, 892 F.2d 1271 at 1274.

126. Id. at 1272-74.
127. Id. at 1272-73. The Court cited to the emphasis on the principals of sovereignty
contemplated by the Supreme Court in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.

347 at 356; and Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 at 437.
128.

Id. at 1272 (referring to the language of Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 at

129.

Id. at 1273 (citing to the alien exemption provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988)).

130.

13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 423.

131.

502 F. Supp. 472.

285).
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a clear intent to include such protection
to alien laborers manifested
32
citizens.
American
for
The majority disposed of Boureslan's argument by first noting
that the domestic focus of Title VII, as evidenced through the Act's
references to "United States", "states" and "state proceedings' is inconsistent with a congressional intent to give an act "international
focus. ' 133 The majority also pointed out that Title VII is "curiously
silent in a number of areas where congress ordinarily speaks if it
wants to extend its legislation beyond our borders."' 134 Citing Congress' failure to address potential conflicts with foreign discrimination laws, while making similar accommodations for state discrimination laws, the majority noted the failure of Title VII to resolve
potential venue problems that may occur with foreign violations. 5
The majority also proposed that if extraterritorial coverage is given
to Title VII, nothing would prevent American employees from asserting Title VII actions against their foreign employers overseas as
well. 36 Since Title VII does not exempt foreign employers from its
scope, the majority contended that if Boureslan was to prevail, nothing could prevent other citizens from filing Title VII claims against
their foreign employers. 3 " Finally, the majority cited to a number of
congressional acts which have recently been amended with specific
provisions granting extraterritorial coverage.' 38 The majority argued
that since Congress had made specific provisions to give extraterritorial reach to those acts, its failure to "provide the usual nuts-andbolts provisions for enforcing those rights" to Title VII, indicates
that there was no intent on the part of Congress to provide for such
coverage.' 39
In a rather lengthy and heated dissent, Judge King challenged
132. 892 F.2d 1271. Boureslan argued that if the Court did not use the negative inference of section 702, the provision would serve no purpose. Id.
133. Id. at 1274.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1988) which establishes that venue "in

any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have
been committed ... ").
136.

Id. at 1274.

137.

Id.

138. Id. The Court cited to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended in
1984, to give the Act extraterritorial application, 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1988). The term "em-

ployee" includes "any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country." The Court also referred to the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1979 & Supp. 1989); The Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
139. Id. at 1274.
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the majority opinion, finding that the language of Title VII evidenced a clear expression of congressional intent to give extraterritorial reach to the Act. 140 Citing to the Supreme Court language of
Foley Brothers v. Filardo,'4 ' Judge King remarked that "we are
guided by a presumption that Acts of Congress are intended to apply
only within the territory of the United States unless there is a clear
expression of congressional intent to the contrary. 1 4 King explained
that the "clear expression of congressional intent" creating extraterritorial reach is manifested in the alien exemption provision. 4 3 Judge
King contended that "[i] f Congress had not envisioned an extraterritorial application of Title VII, a specific provision exempting only
aliens from such coverage would not have been needed.' 4 4 King
pointed out that a provision which specifically precludes coverage of
aliens employed overseas, but which is silent as to the disposition of
American employees, manifests a Congressional design to provide
Title VII protection for American laborers abroad. 4 5
Judge King further contested the holding of the majority when
she determined that the legislative history of Title VII revealed a
legislative assumption that the Act has extraterritorial reach. 46 She
circumvented the traditional "respect for sovereignty" argument by
noting that section 702 does not extend its focus to foreign nationals
working in territories outside the United States, but is rather limited
to citizens of the United States. 47 King urged that the limited exemption for American citizens to retain their fundamental rights and
opportunities does not encroach upon another nation's sovereignty in
a way which the Supreme Court would find unacceptable under Fo140. Id. at 1274-79.
141. 336 U.S. 281.
142. Boureslan, 892 U.S. 1271 at 1275 (citing to Foley Bros. v. Filardo,336 U.S. 281).
143. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988)).
144. Id. at 1275.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1276. Judge King determined that:
[a]lthough the legislative history of section 702 is not remarkably illuminating, I
have found nothing in the published records that contradicts my interpretation of
the provisions's extraterritorial language. Rather, it seems clear that section 702 is a
'limited exemption' for employers and that "the intent of the [alien] exemption is to
remove conflicts of law which might otherwise exist between the United States and
a foreign nation in the employment of aliens outside the United States by an Ameri-

can enterprise."
Id. (quoting Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2303 (1963) (testimony of Rep. Roosevelt explaining provisions of
H.R. 405, which was incorporated into Title VII of H.R. 7152).
147. Id. at 1277.
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ley Brothers.48
King's strongest argument against the limited territorial presumption established by the Supreme Court in Foley Brothers v. Filardo,149 is found in her recitation of Justice Reed's opinion in Foley
Brothers5 ' on the distinctions he drew between alien and American
laborers. 5 ' One of the principal arguments asserted by the Court in
Foley Brothers in opposition of extraterritorial jurisdiction for the
Eight Hour Law centered on the absence of any provision in the Act
which distinguished the protections of alien employees from American employees.' 5 2 An extraterritorial application therefore, would
necessarily involve foreign as well as American laborers. 53 The Supreme Court suggested that a federal law regulating the protection
of alien laborers overseas would necessarily intrude upon that nation's "local concerns" and would be an unlawful extension of congressional authority.15 4 The Court, however, maintained that such
protection may lawfully be extended to American employees overseas had there been an indication from the language of the Act that
Congress had intended to distinguish the protections for American
laborers from those granted to alien workers. 5 The Court explained
that:
[n]o distinction is drawn therein between laborers who are aliens
and those who are citizens of the United States. Unless we were to
read such a distinction into the statute we should be forced to conclude, under respondent's reasoning, that Congress intended to regulate the working hours of a citizen of Iran who chanced to be
employed on a public work of the United States in that foreign
land. Such a conclusion would be logically inescapable although
labor conditions in Iran were known to be wholly dissimilar to
those in the United States and wholly beyond the control of this
nation. .

.

.The absence of any distinction between citizen and

alien labor indicates to us that the statue was intended to apply
only to those places where the labor conditions of both citizen and
156
alien employees are a probable concern of Congress.
Judge King concluded from this argument that "[b]y explicitly ex148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
336 U.S. 281.
Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1277-78.
Id.
Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285-86.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
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empting aliens employed abroad from the scope of Title VII, Congress addressed the factor that the Supreme Court had identified as
most likely to violate principles of foreign sovereignty in the extraterritorial application of United States labor laws."' 57
Judge King also suggested that the legitimacy for Title VII's
extraterritorial scope might be prescribed by the approach set forth
in section 403 of the Restatements (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States. 158 Section 403 provides that "as a matter of
international law 'a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe
law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.' "9 Although the majority never addressed this issue in it's
opinion, ARAMCO had made the argument that extraterritorial application of Title VII would be "unreasonable" under section 403.10

King conceded that an affirmative congressional requirement to apply Title VII extraterritorially would be needed if such application
were unreasonable, but she noted further that no such showing
would be necessary, and normal statutory construction could overcome the presumption, if the application was reasonable."6 ' King
proceeded to judge the extraterritorial application of Title VII under
the standard set forth in section 403(2) of the Restatement and determined that it would not be unreasonable for Congress to require
that American companies comply with Title VII in their employment of American citizens in other countries. 6 2 She explained that:
157.

Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1278.

158. RESTATEMENT
159. Id. at 403(1).

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§403 (1984).

160. Boureslan, 892 F.2d 1271.

161. Id. at 1279-82. According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law,
decisionmakers must not only examine national and territorial links, but they must also consider whether exerting jurisdiction is reasonable. Under the Restatements, the jurisdictional
analysis calls for a two-step process. First, the decision maker must determine whether the
dispute has a sufficient nexus (territorial or nation) to justify the assertion of jurisdiction. The
Restatement provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (1)(a) conduct that, wholly
or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or
interests in things, present within its territory; (2) the activities, interests, status, or
relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory. .,Id. at 401-402.
Second, they must decide whether, based on a number of "relevant factors", such an assertion
would be reasoanble in light of general principles of international fairness and of competing
national interests. Id. at § 403(2). The Restatement lists factors such as "the character of the
activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulations to the regulating state[,].

.the

importance of the regulation to the international, political, legal or economic system[,.
extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity." Id.

the

162.

Id. at 1281-82.
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[T]he United States has a strong and legitimate interest in protect-

ing citizens employed abroad by American corporations from discrimination in employment: Title VII is consistent with the norms
of the international community, which has adopted numerous accords condemning discrimination, including discrimination in employment; American citizens have a legitimate expectation that
they will not lose the protection of Title VII when they accept a
position with the foreign office of an American enterprise; and the
potential for conflicts with foreign law are minimized by the fact
that the statue applies only to United States nationals by the
BFOQ [bona fide occupational qualification] defense that has been

interpreted in an opinion endorsed by this court to exempt an emwhere a violation of Title VII is compelled by
ployer from 1 liability
3
foreign law.

1

Four months after the Fifth Circuit decided Boureslan and
while appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, the Western District Court of Washington relied almost exclusively upon Judge
King's dissenting opinion as being the proper determination of Title
VII's territorial effect.16 4 The plaintiffs, Akgun and Contreras, were
American citizens who worked for Boeing Services International
(hereinafter "BSI"), a subsidiary of the Boeing Company in Turkey. 6 Both plaintiffs were married to Turkish nationals and lived in
Turkey during their employment with BSI. 1'6 6 Although initially
treated by BSI as civilian components of the United States armed

forces stationed in Turkey, BSI later determined that because
Akgun and Contreras were married to Turkish nationals, they
should no longer be considered members of the Air Force civilian
component. 67 After firing the plaintiffs for unspecified reasons, BSI
rehired them a year later, but placed them under Turkish employ-

ment contracts.""e By the terms of the new contracts, the plaintiffs
were to be paid in Turkish currency and were also subject to local
income taxes. 69 These practices resulted in a loss of income for the
plaintiffs, who in turn filed charges with the EEOC alleging gender
discrimination. 7

Upon EEOC approval, suit was filed in the West-

163. Id.
164. Akgun v. The Boeing Co., No. 97-104 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file).
165. Id.
166. Id.

167.
168.

Id.
Id.

169.

Id.

170.

Id.
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ern District Court of Washington on August 30, 1989. The Court
held that there was sufficient congressional intent in Title VII to indicate an implied grant of extraterritorial coverage."7 ' The Court
found Judge King's dissenting opinion to be persuasive in its analysis, basing much of its discussion on the rationale she established in
Boureslan v. ARAMCO.
In it's assessment of congressional intent, the district court refuted BSI's contention that a strong presumption stands against any
proposition that an Act of Congress is to apply extraterritorially.' 72
The district court in one sense reversed the implications of Foley
Brothers, that a presumption exists against an act's extraterritorial
coverage, by stressing that "[o]nly if there is absolutely no evidence
of Congressional intent is it presumed that an act is limited in application to territorial jurisdiction.' 173 This determination not only runs
against the majority holding in Boureslan, but also exceeds the presumptions in Judge's King's analysis in her dissent by concluding
that the slightest evidence of a legislative intent to have the Act extend extraterritorially would satisfy the Foley Brothers' standard. 174
Even in the areas of securities, antitrust and trade law, where the
lower courts have taken the lead in giving extraterritorial force to
Congressional acts, there is a general consensus that a minimum
amount of legislative and executive history supports their conclusion. 17 5 The district court also reaffirmed previous arguments which
had supported the "negative inference" of section 702 of Title VII
(alien exemption provision), claiming that the provision offered a
sound indication that the drafters impliedly sought to protect Ameri7
cans working overseas.'V. THE FINAL WORD ON EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION

On January 16, 1991, the Fifth Circuit decision in Boureslan v.
ARAMCO, was argued on appeal before the Supreme Court. 17 7 Two
171.

Id.

172. BSI relied on the language of Foley Bros., Inc., 336 U.S. at 285, which, as noted
previously, held that a contrary congressional intent must be evident in the legislation for an
act to apply outside the presumed territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Akgun, No. 97104.
173.

Id.

174.

Id.

175.

See supra notes 34-42.

176.

Id. (citing to Judge King's analysis that "if no individual was intended to be cov-

ered extraterritorially by Title VII, a specific provision excluding only aliens would be super-

fluous." Boureslan, at 1275 (King, J.,dissenting)).
177.

E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co.,

-

U.S.

-,
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months later Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined that based on the almost complete lack of statutory language which would manifest a congressional intent to the contrary,
Title VII was designed with only a domestic focus in mind.17 This
conclusion was in part the result of a very limited and prohibitive
reading of the Foley Brothers' jurisdictional caveat and its
protegees. 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist laid the foundation of the majority
opinion in the context of the Foley Brothers' standard which, as was
discussed infra, established the principal "'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States'."' 80 In addressing petitioners' first argument, that the broad jurisdictional language of Title VII revealed a congressional intent to extend coverage to Americans overseas, Rehnquist pointed out that the ambiguous language of
the Statute, without more, was by itself an insufficient basis from
which a congressional intent to provide extraterritorial coverage
could be established. 18' Specifically, petitioners referred to the statutory definitions of "employer"and "commerce" which they maintain
is statutory language which manifests a Congressional intent to provide for jurisdictional force outside the United States. 8 2 Respondents on the other hand urged that Congress' failure to use terms
more dispositive of a statute with extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as
"foreign nations" or "foreign commerce", clearly revealed a lack of
Congressional intent to establish jurisdiction outside the United
States.' 83
While Rehnquist found these competing interpretations both
"plausible", he found neither one persuasive, and instead held that
the ambiguity of the language could not reveal a clear Congressional
178. Id. at
179. Id. at
180. Id. at

II..._,
I S.Ct. at 1229-1237.
, 1I S.Ct. at 1235-1237.
II11 S.Ct. at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 at

285).
181. Id.at., 111 S. Ct. at 1231-1232.
182. Id.at
ll
I, S. Ct. at 1231. The definition of "employer" under Title VII is
defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) (1988). The term "commerce" is defined by Title VII as "trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States; or between a State
and any place outside thereof; or within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United
States; or between points in the same State but through a point outside thereof." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(g) (1988).
183. Id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1231.
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intent that Title VII was designed to apply extraterritorially.8 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked that "[t]he language relied upon
by petitioners - and it is they who must make the affirmative showing - is ambiguous, and does not speak directly to the question
presented here."'18 5 The majority also found petitioners' reliance on
the "negative inference" argument of the alien exemption provision
unpersuasive, and unsupported by any other element in Title VII." 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that the lack of more persuasive
and express statutory language to reinforce petitioners' reliance on
the negative inference of Title VII, necessitated a finding that Congress had only intended to exclude alien laborers from the protective
umbrella of Title VII, whether employer within the United States or
abroad. 87 In ascertaining the persuasiveness of the negative inference of the alien exemption provision, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that if petitioners' assumption were correct, then there would
be no way of distinguishing "in its application between United States
employers and foreign employers."' 188 To illustrate this point, Rehnquist explained that absent a distinction in the statute between
American and foreign employers, an American citizen employed by
a French company in France would be able to subject that company
to the prohibitions of Title VII.89 Noting the obvious dilemma of a
conflict in laws, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that:
Without clear evidence of congressional intent to do so than is contained in the alien-exemption clause, we are unwilling to ascribe to
that body a policy which would raise difficult issues of international
law by imposing this country's employment-discrimination regime
upon foreign corporations operating in foreign commerce. °0
Rehnquist reinforced this proposition by suggesting that other "elements" lend credibility to his belief that Title VII is a domestic statute.'' Specifically, Rehnquist cited to Congress' failure to provide
184.

185.
186.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at..,

, Ill S. Ct. at 1231-1232.

, I IlS. Ct. at 1231.
111 S. Ct. at 1233-1234. Noting that "[t]he statute as a whole indicates

a concern that it not unduly interfere with the sovereignty and laws of the States", Rehnquist
cited to numerous provisions in the statute which purportedly reveal a "purely domestic focus".

Rehnquist concluded that continued references to "States" and "state proceedings" and the
failure to even once mention "foreign nations" or "foreign proceedings", was a clear indication
of Congress' intent to restrict the jurisdictional focus of Title VII to a domestic scope. Id.
187. Id. at -111
S. Ct. at 1234.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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for a single mechanism through which Title VII may be enforced
1 92
extraterritorially.
Moreover, the majority also noted that the limited investigative
authority that the EEOC is empowered with under Title VII further
19 3
suggests that Title VII was designed as a domestic statute only.
Specifically, the majority points to the fact the EEOC is jurisdictionally bound to issue subpoenas within areas under the jurisdiction of
the United States, and that the EEOC is only permitted to act in
accordance with the express authority of the Statute."" Referring to
95
the Court's decision in General Electric Company v. Gilbert,
which recognized that "Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations",
the majority determined that any effort by the EEOC to influence
the affairs of American actors overseas must overcome a strong presumption that its authority is jurisdictionally limited. 6
In their conclusion, the majority stressed that "[w]hen it desires
to do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute. 19 7 To illustrate this caveat, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited numerous acts which were subsequently
amended with an express provision that provided for extraterritorial
coverage. 9 8 The majority went on to declare that "congress, should
it wish to do so, may similarly amend Title VII and in doing so will
192. Id. The majority pointed out that the State's venue provisions, specifically § 2000e5(0(3) (1988), are "ill-suited for extraterritorial application as they provide for venue only in
a judicial district in the state where certain matters related to the employer occurred or were
located." Id.
193. Id. at -I, 111 S. Ct. at 1234 (referring to § 2000e-9, which permits the EEOC to
issue subpoenas for witnesses and documents from anyplace in the United States or any Territory or possession thereof.").
194. Id.
195. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
196. Id. at -, Il1 S. Ct. at 1235 (citing to General Electric Co., 429 U.S at 140-146).
The Court in that decision went on to hold that the level of deference afforded the EEOC "will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at 141 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)). Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to cite numerous instances in EEOC's
history where the Commission made pronouncements which supported the conclusion that its
authority was to be limited to a domestic focus. Id. at 1235. Based on this and other findings
in earlier EEOC guidelines, as well as judicial interpretations concerning the extent of its
authority, Rehnquist concluded that EEOC would be unable to overcome the strong presumption that Title VII is a domestic act. Id.
197. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1235 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 448 U.S. 428, 440 (1989)).
198. Id. at __, 111 S. Ct. at 1236.
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be able to calibrate its provision in a way that we cannot."' 9 9 Justice
Scalia concurred in the majority opinion, but disagreed over the narrow scope of authority that the majority accorded the EEOC. 00 Relying upon the Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Incorporated v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Incorporated,20 ' Justice Scalia
contended that the EEOC should be entitled to a greater amount of
deference concering matters similar to the one presented before the
Court 2
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens, dissented. 3 The dissent focused their argument primarily on
the contention that the majority had overstated the strength of the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 2 4 According to the dissent,
the majority had elevated the presumption to a "clear-statement"
rule, virtually requiring a recitation of extraterritorial intent in the
statute itself to the exclusion of "all of the traditional tools" of statutory interpretation historically used to discern congressional intent.20 5 Specifically, the dissent stressed that the majority had not
properly evaluated the legislative history and language of the statute,
together with the administrative interpretations of Title VII, in
reaching its conclusion.206
VI.

CONCLUSION

The pervasive question of whether Title VII had extraterritorial
force is a difficult one for the courts to adjudicate. The noticeable
legislative silence on the issue, despite increasing numbers of American laborers seeking employment in the expanding markets overseas,
presents a major obstacle for proponents of extraterritorial application. At the core of dilemma is the notion that the regulation of the
employment practices of corporations operating overseas, unlike securities, antitrust or trade regulation, is more likely to offend the
laws, customs and practices of other nations. Whereas the impact of
199. Id.
200, Id. at , III S. Ct. at 1236.
201. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that federal courts are to defer responsibility to define the scope of a particular statute to the appropriate administrative agency when Congress
has failed to address the point at issue).
202. Id. at .- , I11 S. Ct. at 1236-1237. However, Justice Scalia was careful to point
out that "deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ." Id.
at 1237.
203.

Id. at

204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id. at
Id.

I1I S. Ct. at 1237-46.

,

,

111 S. Ct. at 1237.
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forcing an overseas employer to abide by the restrictions in the Clayton Act or 1934 Securities Act questions only the integrity of that
nation's business laws, the effect of compelling compliance with a
civil rights act poses a more difficult problem. Despite recognition of
a generally growing consensus against discriminatory employment
practices, 0 7 such practices nevertheless remain prevalent among a
majority of nations.
Victims of discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion
and national origin normally have two foes, the corporate entity and
the laws and practices of the nation where it is located. It is one
thing to compel a corporation to abate the practices that cause Title
VII violations, but quite another where it is the laws, customs or
general practice of that nation which dictate that these policies be
employed. The notion that an executive or administrative function be
assumed by a black individual in South Africa, a woman in South
East Asia or a Jew in an Arab state, by our standards a generally
accepted concept, are typically deemed 'offensive and repugnant to
the laws and practices of that country. For a court to compel a corporation, under the remedies provided by Title VII, to hire, reinstate,
or compensate an individual in a country where that particular employee is considered 'unacceptable', would, aside from the potential
conflict of laws, permit the United States government to dictate the
employment practices of American corporations in countries where
their existing laws may be inopposite. This dilemma is especially
acute in light of the increasing number of American laborers who
now seek employment overseas.
Moreover, and of greater concern for such laborers, is the possibility that American corporations may attempt to shield discriminatory employment practices behind the veil of favorable foreign laws.
Using the principles laid down by the Court in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian
207. See, e.g., Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, Law and the Status of Women: An International Symposium, reprinted in 8 COLUM.
HumI. RTS. L. REv. 1 (1976); see also Note, United States Labor Practices in South Africa:
Will a Mandatory Fair Employment Code Succeed Where the Sullivan Principles Have

Failed? 7

FORDHAM INT'L. L.

J. 358 (1984); Report of the World Conference to Review and

Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations' Decade for Women: Equality, Development
and Peace 132-47 (1985); Sohn, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROTECTION OF THE
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS RATHER THAN STATES, 32 AM U.L. REV. 1 (1982); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at

53, 55-56 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47 U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965); Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542, 24 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
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American Oil Company,"8 it is apparent that corporations are generally free to mandate employment policies under the scrutiny of
their host nations, unchecked by Congressional legislation. Considering the level of regulation typically imposed on corporations operating overseas, it is evident that these corporations will have virtual
autonomy in their employment practices.
The comprehensive scope of the Supreme Court's decision has
settled the question of Title VII's jurisdictional effect, at least temporarily. Although the majority effectively removed Title VII protection for thousands of United States citizens now working overseas,
the Court did leave open the question of whether it would protect
such employees where the discrimination occurred within the United
States. Finally, should Congress ever choose to pass legislation that
would broaden the jurisdictional force of Title VII overseas, the majority made it abundantly clear that such legislation would, no
doubt, pass Constitutional and judicial scrutiny.
Sean M. Bunting

208.

.. U.S

, III S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
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